Published on: 06 Jun 2011
It seems that Deloitte has had a spot of bother in dealing with one of its Chinese clients.
When they initially won the audit for Longtop they were no doubt very pleased.
Longtop Financial Technologies Ltd., to give it its full name, is a Hong Kong-based maker of financial software. In 2007 it raised $210 million in a US IPO underwritten by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank.
Things haven’t been going too well recently though. Their share price has plunged by 56% since last November reducing the company’s market value by more than $1 billion.
They have also just lost their auditors as Deloitte has just resigned.
Auditor resignations aren’t that unusual but in Deloitte’s resignation letter that was submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission there are a few items which to put them in non technical language, sound “extremely dodgy”.
The full resignation letter submitted to the SEC can be found here but some extracts of the letter showing the highlights (or lowlights) of some items that Deloitte identified at Longtop are as follows (note that the bold emphasis on certain words was made by us):
[Start of extract from resignation letter]
As part of the process for auditing the Company’s financial statements for the year ended 31 March 2011, we determined that, in regard to bank confirmations, it was appropriate to perform follow up visits to certain banks. These audit steps were recently performed and identified a number of very serious defects including: statements by bank staff that their bank had no record of certain transactions; confirmation replies previously received were said to be false; significant differences in deposit balances reported by the bank staff compared with the amounts identified in previously received confirmations (and in the books and records of the Group); and significant bank borrowings reported by bank staff not identified in previously received confirmations (and not recorded in the books and records of the Group).
In the light of this, a formal second round of bank confirmation was initiated on 17 May. Within hours however, as a result of intervention by the Company’s officials including the Chief Operating Officer, the confirmation process was stopped amid serious and troubling new developments including: calls to banks by the Company asserting that Deloitte was not their auditor; seizure by the Company’s staff of second round bank confirmation documentation on bank premises; threats to stop our staff leaving the Company premises unless they allowed the Company to retain our audit files then on the premises; and then seizure by the Company of certain of our working papers.
In that connection, we must insist that you promptly return our documents.
[End of extract of resignation letter]
I have to say that my initial observations are that Deloitte did the right thing in resigning!
Longtop however have released a press release in connection with the resignation and included the statement that they have “initiated a search for a new auditor.”
Somehow I’m not convinced that the other top auditing companies will be rushing out to win Longtop as a client.
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Published on: 25 Oct 2010
Its ownership structure is dominated by News Corporation, the transnational media conglomerate owned by Rupert Murdoch, whose other ventures include numerous newspapers and Fox studios in the USA.
It’s fair to say that Rupert Murdoch is a controversial figure.
A review of the most recent financial statements shows that News Corporation presently owns approximately 39.1% of the shares of BSkyB. The next two largest shareholders own 5.02% and 3.01% of the votes in the company.
In other words, resisting the might of News Corporation to impose its will on BSkyB would require something more akin to a peasants’ revolt than a more standard company vote in the AGM.
IFRS 3 defines a subsidiary as an entity that is controlled by another entity.
Looking at the evidence, it would appear that the 39.1% ownership would be enough to give control of BSkyB to News Corporation, on grounds that it would be almost impossible to resist decisions favoured by such a dominant investor.
One such decision was appointing James Murdoch, son of Rupert Murdoch as chairman of BSkyB. Lots of investors didn’t like this, but Murdoch took the helm of the company.
News Corporation produces its financial statements under US GAAP and has always consolidated BSkyB using the equity method, as an associate.
Under IFRS, it would have been arguable that full consolidation as a subsidiary would have presented a more true and fair view, as IFRS uses more principles based recognition of control than US GAAP.
However, a shock recently came to News Corporation, when it tried to increase its holding from 39.1% to a clearly controlling 61%.
The board of BSkyB refused to agree with the chairman that an offer of 700p per share should be accepted. The board defied its biggest investor and said that they would recommend refusal of any offer less than 800p. This appears to have come rather as a surprise to the dominant Murdoch family, who show signs of thinking of BSkyB as their fiefdom.
It’s just a nice example of when apparent control is not control and thus how to be cautious in deciding when to consolidate a company as a subsidiary, even if it generally does everything you tell it to. If there appears to be a chance of the other investors saying “enough” and refusing to give into your will, it’s not a subsidiary.
What will make Ernst & Young different from the rest of the Big 4? Will it be an Executive Decision or…
Published on: 09 Jul 2010
This is a major move for the accountancy profession.
The profession has been under increasing regulatory pressure for a while now and the decision to appoint non-execs is reportedly in response to the new audit firm governance code that was published earlier this year.
The revised Ernst & Young advisory council structure will in broad terms mean that Ernst & Young will have a board structure which is similar to the multi-national companies that are their clients. Their remit will include monitoring strategy and risk.
Their global advisory council currently includes 36 senior partners. These partners will soon be joined by 4 non-executive directors drawn from the business and regulatory world.
The names of these non-execs will be disclosed later this year and although I’m not a betting man I’d probably have a wager that their CVs will not include the names of Deloitte, KPMG or PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Published on: 11 Nov 2009
Royal Bank of Scotland (the UK based banking group) has had its fair share of troubles of late. It made some acquisitions that in retrospect were a clear mistake, such as its purchase of ABN Amro. It failed to manage risk properly, having chosen to fire its risk manager; allegedly for making too much noise about the company taking too many risks. The result of this all was a taxpayer bail out and the enforced departure of its chief executive, Sir Fred Goodwin.
At the time it became obvious that stakeholders were going to require a good degree of blood letting at board level, the bank’s chairman discussed the situation with Sir Fred. As a result, Sir Fred chose to resign, taking his right to an annual pension of £703,000 with him. Had he been fired, his pension rights would have been closer to zero.
Much public comment and anger followed, with virtually all of this aimed at the outgoing CEO. But where were the non-executives? The general duties of non-executive director are:
Remuneration: decide appropriate pay (including pensions) for executive directors in the circumstances.
Internal control and risk management supervision. History shows that this is at least questionable.
Scrutinise the executive directors.
Strategy: contribute to strategy.
Sir Fred Goodwin was entitled to his pension. He later voluntarily chose to waive £200,000 per year, but universal legal opinion is that he would have been entitled to the full amount, because the non-executives allowed him to resign.
Perhaps the press and the public are venting their frustration and anger too much at the executive directors?
Published on: 07 Oct 2009
You may have heard of easyJet. You may have flown with easyJet. You may be Stelios, in which case the public thinks that you own easyJet, but you actually only own a minority interest. The public also thinks that you’re the CEO, but actually you’re not even an executive director.
What you do own, if you happen to be Sir Stelios Haji-Ioannou is approximately 66 million easyJet shares and the easyJet brand, which you licence to easyJet.
Sir Stelios is the public face of a company that he founded and grew to a state of financial health where it could buy its most bitter rival, list on the London Stock Exchange and generally grow up rather quickly. He resigned as an executive director in 2003, becoming a non-executive.
In 2008/09, he had a major difference of opinion with the executive directors over the strategy of the company. Having been outvoted, Sir Stelios (a non-executive director, remember) sought to increase his equity ownership of the company again to a level where he could appoint some favoured nominees of his own as executive directors; thus giving him (a non-executive director) effective control once again.
Sir Stelios was naturally acting in the best interests of the company as he saw them. The Tyson report lists four duties of a non-executive director (see our ExPress notes if these don’t trip off your tongue! /expand/14-p1_professional_accountant.html) These include scrutinising executives, but not sacking them if they disagree.
It all makes it easier to see why the UK Combined Code requires that non-executives should be paid a basic salary only and have no shares or share options in the company, as well as requiring you to wait at least five years outside the company if you’d previously been a senior executive there!